On June 30, 2026, the White House published the release Trump Administration NEPA Reforms: A Win for All Americans ending the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). President Trump began his drive to end NEPA over a year ago. Since then over 60 agencies and departments have returned to core requirements of the law (CEQ) and moving critical projects without unnecessary delays. These changes impact project approvals, ground breakings, and creating jobs. It encourages investment and strengthens US infrastructure. It unleashes American energy while conserving our lands. Ultimately, it will defend our nation through streamlined environmental reviews for Defense Industrial Base priorities as well as advance critical mineral investments.
On June 30, 2026, in response to the SCOTUS ruling West Virginia v. B. P. J. (discussed below) on Trans Athletes in women's and girls' sports, First Lady Melania Trump wrote on X:
“As many of you may know, I fully support the LGBTQIA+ community. But we must also ensure that our female athletes are protected and respected." - MELANIA, #1 NYT Bestseller, (p. 156)
The U.S. Supreme Court has now legally confirmed this opinion:
“Under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, may schools maintain women’s and girls’ sports for biological females? ... The answer is yes.”
America, we can support the rights of the LGBTQIA+ community and also protect opportunities for female athletes. Respect everyone and keep girls' sports fair.
Both ideals are essential.
I disagree with the First Lady's underlying premise
we can support the rights of the LGBTQIA+ community and also protect opportunities for female athletes
If you support the "rights" of born-male-athletes-on-drugs-with-mental-illness then you also support their being in traditionally biological female spaces because they 'believe' they are women/girls.
If you support the female athletes "rights" to not compete against born-male-athletes-on-drugs-with-mental-illness then you will not allow these same creatures into female spaces, period.
I think you cannot do both.
I think the fairest way to proceed, since we are obviously catering to mental illnesses these days, is to provide a 3rd option: separate private facilities and separate teams for competition. If there are "so many" of them out there, they should be able to form at least 1 team of like-minded creatures (you could even allow them to recruit actual biological males or females who would CHOOSE to join their team knowing they would not have the privacy afforded in single-sex situations) and leave both the male and female teams/spaces out of the equation.
So the House pulled a Senate move and apparently renamed HR1399, gutted the act, and turned it into a bill to release sexual harassment monetary settlements. Personally, I am ok with the fact that they voted overwhelmingly to release the records. I just wish they would have created a bill specifically for this rather than using an existing bill number. On the 'not voting' side DeGette & Hayes from the dumocrats chose not to vote on this issue (makes me wonder if their names are in the settlement accounts) while on the GOP side, Representative Luna's contingent looks like they're down to 8 members refusing to vote on any bills that do not include the SAVE America Act: Burchett, Burlison, Dunn (FL), Emmer, Joyce (OH), Lucas, Luna, and Wied.
Perhaps it's time for both chambers of Congress to add the year to the bill number so We The People can easily tell which bill is which?
And now both chambers are on a mini vacation with both due to meet July 2 (and, I suspect, they will then take a long weekend . . . again) with the Senate scheduled to have another one-minute pro forma meeting to keep President Trump from making recess appointments. Not sure what the House will do; but, it looks like Speaker Johnson is keeping them on task pushing forth legislation that is NOT the SAVE America Act or will codify President Trump's EOs (like English as our country's language or birthright citizenship - and the formula of citizenship for children is really easy - no matter WHERE the child is born, citizenship needs to be based on the parent's citizenship:
1 American & 1 American = American child
1 American & 1 Foreigner = American or Dual Citizenship child (child chooses one at age 18)
1 Foreigner & 1 Foreigner = Foreigner child
Dual loyalties are not acceptable. You cannot serve two masters while being faithful to both:
No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon. (Matthew 6:24).
Citizenship, then and now, was the right to have rights—to freely participate in our political community. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment extended that promise to “every free-born person in this land.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 600 (Sen. Trumbull). We keep that promise today. The judgment of the District Court for the District of New Hampshire is affirmed.
Justice Jackson (and Sotomayor) concur (delving into the Civil War and its aftermath):
I add only that the Fourteenth Amendment’s universalist aims should forever be the death knell for this kind of claim—one that seeks to make bloodline the marker of birthright. The America that was reborn from the rubble of the Civil War simply does not countenance that inequitable result. Thankfully, a majority of the Court remembered this today, and has dutifully preserved the most basic animating principle of our Nation’s founding—that all human beings are created equal—once more.
Justice Kavanaugh concurs in part and dissents in part:
Executive Order does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Order does contravene 8 U. S. C. §1401(a). Consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could amend §1401(a) or otherwise enact new legislation establishing exceptions to birthright citizenship for children born to foreign citizens unlawfully or temporarily in the country. But Congress has not yet done so.
Justice Thomas (and Gorsuch) dissents:
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in the wake of the Civil War, “with the one pervading purpose” of securing equal citizenship for the freed slaves. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall., at 71. It was enacted, as Justice Harlan wrote, “to secure to a race recently emancipated” the “civil rights” that other citizens enjoyed. Plessy, 163 U. S., at 555–556. This Court has time and again denied Americans that promise. Shortly after the Amendment was ratified, this Court deprived black citizens of the right to peaceably assemble and to keep and bear arms. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876); see McDonald, 561 U. S., at 808–809 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). A little later, in Plessy, the Court upheld the subjugation of black citizens in the form of state-coerced racial segregation. 163 U. S. 537. When it had an opportunity to correct that profound error, it did so narrowly. See Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U. S. 483, 494, and n. 11 (1954). It then used that very decision to justify busing American children to different schools based on their race. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1 (1971). And, until recently, this Court continued to selectively enforce our colorblind Constitution, including by allowing state-coerced racial discrimination in public education, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306 (2003), and compelling States to draw political districts on the basis of race, e.g., Allen v. Milligan, 599 U. S. 1 (2023). Meanwhile, the Court has repurposed the Fourteenth Amendment to protect its own set of preferred rights that the Reconstruction Congress never contemplated and that cannot find support in its text. Today, the Court does so again by recognizing a constitutional right to citizenship for the children of all foreign birth tourists and illegal aliens. I am not sure that today’s opinion will stand the test of time. The Citizenship Clause “added greatly to the dignity and glory of American citizenship.” Plessy, 163 U. S., at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Today’s opinion devalues that citizenship. I respectfully dissent.
Justice Alito dissents:
Respondents’ claim in this case is that Executive Order No. 14160 is unconstitutional on its face. To prevail on this facial claim, they must show that “no set of circumstances exists under which the [Executive Order] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987). And because the order is valid as applied to nationals from the countries discussed above, the claim should fail. In all likelihood, the Executive Order is also constitutional as applied to nationals from a great many other countries, but no such showing is needed here. Indeed, showing merely that the Executive Order is valid as applied to a child born to a birth tourist would be enough to defeat respondents’ facial claim. That is why the Court goes out of its way to hold that even a child born to a mother who is here for only a brief time is a citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment. Ante, at 3–4, 19–20. The Court’s interpretation is not only contrary to the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, it produces grotesque results. While foreigners who wish to immigrate lawfully must sometimes wait for many years, a child born here to a birth tourist is automatically a citizen. The Court’s interpretation also has national-security implications. Accord, ante, at 56 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Suppose that a person’s only connection to this country is that he was born here to a mother who was present just long enough to give birth and then quickly returned to her native country. Suppose that country is a strategic adversary or enemy of the United States. Suppose the child never visited the United States while growing up and was inculcated with hatred of this country. According to the Court, that person is a citizen of the United States. He can enter and leave the country as he pleases. He can travel the world on a United States passport. Even if he plots to harm this country, he cannot be deprived of his status as a citizen, at least under current precedent. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 259–260 (1980). The Court’s interpretation saddles this country with an ancient British rule that even the United Kingdom has abandoned, as have other countries whose legal systems share the same pedigree. The Court’s interpretation preserves a powerful incentive to enter or remain in this country illegally. Immigrants naturally prefer affluent countries where economic opportunities are available. Other than Canada, the United States will be the only affluent nation where birth alone is enough to establish citizenship. If the Fourteenth Amendment required these results, the country would have to live with them or amend the Constitution. But the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the rule the Court now imposes on the country. In my judgment, the Court has made a mistake that will seriously affect the country’s future. For that reason, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Gorsuch dissents:
At the heart of today’s dispute lie two competing views of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. On one account, the Clause incorporated the English common law rule of jus soli (literally, the “right of the soil”). That rule, developed in feudal times, had more to do with being a subject than a citizen. It was based on the notion that a “man owed personal service to the lord of the soil, the same as his master owed it to the king; and it was born with the child and only ended in the grave.” 2 Cong. Rec. 3282 (1874); see also 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 369 (1768); ante, at 2–4 (majority opinion). On the other account, the Clause adopted a distinctly American settler’s view of citizenship. One that promises the full “dignity and glory of American citizenship” to any child born in this country to parents who have made this Nation their permanent home, regardless of their race, religion, or national origin. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also ante, at 1–3 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). To my eye, the latter understanding better accords with the Clause’s original public meaning and that leads me to join JUSTICE THOMAS’s dissent. I write only to emphasize a few points. First, the understanding JUSTICE THOMAS and I share of the Citizenship Clause is consistent with this Court’s holding in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898). That case involved parents born in China who had made their home in this country lawfully, even though they never became naturalized citizens and statutes then in effect made that impossible. See id., at 652, 701. The question the Court faced was whether the parents’ child, born in this country, was himself a citizen. The government argued that the child was not a citizen because his parents were not. Id., at 666. This Court—rightly—rejected the government’s position. Throughout history, many other nations have restricted citizenship by birth to the children of citizens. See ante, at 13, n. 1 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). But the American settler’s view of citizenship reflected in the Citizenship Clause is not so parsimonious. What matters isn’t whether a child’s parents are citizens. What matters is whether they (and, by law, their child at birth) have made this place their home and are thus “domiciled within the United States.” Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S., at 693.
Second, respondents chose to pursue a facial challenge to the executive order at issue in this case and secured below a preliminary injunction barring every one of the order’s potential applications. Under this Court’s precedents, we can sustain that injunction only if “no set of circumstances exists” in which the order may be applied lawfully. United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987). That is a demanding standard, and it is not met here. Among other things, the executive order holds that children born to temporary visitors in this country, whether here lawfully or unlawfully, are not citizens. And at least to that extent, the order is consistent with the Citizenship Clause as JUSTICE THOMAS and I read it. By definition, temporary visitors to this country do not choose to make a permanent home here, and their children thus cannot claim the privilege of citizenship. Because the executive order is lawful at least to this extent, respondents’ facial challenge must fail. See ibid.; ante, at 56–57 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
Finally, just because the executive order has some lawful applications and can survive a facial challenge does not mean it is lawful across the board and immune from narrower legal challenges. Besides addressing temporary visitors, the order also denies the benefits of citizenship to children born in this country to parents who make their permanent home here, but do so in defiance of federal immigration laws. The government insists that aspect of the order can survive any possible legal challenge, too, because individuals can secure domicile in this country only if they do so in compliance with federal law. See ante, at 57–58, n. 10 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). About that, however, I harbor doubts. Perhaps Wong Kim Ark does not squarely foreclose the government’s position. After all, that case addressed a child born to parents who lawfully resided in this country. Still, I wonder: Is a child born here to parents who have long chosen to make this Nation their permanent home not a citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment solely because his parents’ presence violates statutory law? If those parents are not domiciled here, then where are they domiciled? And if the answer is nowhere, how can we reconcile that conclusion with this Court’s longstanding recognition that every person is domiciled somewhere? See Desmare v. United States, 93 U. S. 605, 610 (1877). Because the executive order is not facially invalid, these questions may not be properly before us. But their answers are undeniably important to a Nation committed to a view of citizenship open to all children born here to parents who can call this country their home.
The SCOTUS 'majority' view creates a country with no borders. Come here, have your children, then go home and raise them to hate the country in which they were born and in which they hold citizenship. The "minority" view is the same as the majority of actual US Citizens: if your parents are foreigners, so are you. However, in Islamic centers, the US-born-child never needs to leave US soil to be raised in a culture that hates America. They are being raised under Islamic Shari'a law instead of US laws. Something needs to be done about this as well.
We need a Congress that is willing to put "who is a citizen" into law. And, they need to address those who break US law by imposing foreign laws on US soil. However, that Congress is not the Congress we currently have. So, this November, remember this and select politicians who you think will uphold the sanctity of the United States as a sovereign country and to protect US citizens as sovereign individuals with the Rights Granted by the Creator and written into our founding documents.
The 2nd SCOTUS ruling is about "trans" rights.
In the lawsuit West Virginia v. B. P. J. docket # 24-43 filed in SCOTUS appealing docket # 23-1130 & 23-1078 filed in the 4th Circuit Court argued October 27, 2023, decided April 16, 2024 where 23-1130 was fully dismissed and 23-1078 was vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions from Judge Heytens who wrote the majority opinion. West Virginia then appealed to SCOTUS who accepted the suit and made a final ruling.
The reason this lawsuit is not included in the list of lawsuits against President Trump is because it is NOT against President Trump. The original lawsuit (which I have not yet located) was appealed by 2023 and decided upon in 2024, during the Autopen Administration. However, the outcome of the SCOTUS appeal supports President Trump's current EOs about the biological sex vs gender nonsense. These cases concern two of those state laws, from West Virginia and Idaho.
The question before SCOTUS in this case is:
Under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, may schools maintain women’s and girls’ sports for biological females? In other words, may schools determine eligibility for women’s and girls’ sports based on biological sex? The answer is yes.
In a 77-page ruling, SCOTUS issued the following opinions:
Justice Kavanaugh issued the court's opinion:
. . . To provide equal opportunity for female athletes, schools do not merely maintain, for example, one soccer team, one basketball team, one ice hockey team, and one lacrosse team that are equally open to female and male athletes. That approach would deny equal opportunity to female athletes because, as all agree, females and males have inherent physical differences relevant to athletic performance. Those “[p]hysical differences between men and women” are “enduring.” . . . The differences include, among other things, height, weight, strength, speed, endurance, and jumping ability. Therefore, in contact sports, forcing female athletes to compete against males can create significant safety risks. And in virtually all competitive sports, forcing female athletes to compete against males can undermine competitive fairness. . . . To ensure equal opportunity, Title IX’s regulations also require schools to provide the women’s and men’s teams equivalent equipment, facilities, scheduling, and the like. . . . 27 States—as well as the International Olympic Committee, the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee, and the NCAA—have banned all biological males from competing in women’s and girls’ sports. . . . the legal question for Title IX purposes is whether West Virginia may limit women’s and girls’ sports teams to biological females. As a matter of text and history, West Virginia may do so. . . . we recognize that student-athletes are understandably disappointed and upset when they do not make a team or otherwise cannot participate. But the Title IX regulations guarantee “equal athletic opportunity.” The regulations cannot and do not guarantee every student a spot on a team’s roster. . . . Title VII concerns employment, whereas Title IX as relevant here focuses on sports. . . . Title IX authorizes separate men’s and women’s sports teams. . . . Ratified in 1868, the Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall deny “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” . . . That command “must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons.” . . . Sex-based classifications are permissible only when the classification is “substantially related” to achieving an “important” government objective. . . . The West Virginia and Idaho laws authorize separate female and male sports teams. And the laws limit women’s and girls’ sports teams to biological females. In doing so, the laws make a sex-based classification that triggers intermediate scrutiny. . . . So the equal protection questions become: What are the States’ interests in maintaining separate teams for males and females, and in limiting female teams to biological females? And is the States’ sex-based classification—that is, the limitation of women’s and girls’ sports teams to biological females—substantially related to those interests? . . . The States start with the undisputed proposition that biological males generally possess inherent physical advantages in sports—in height, weight, strength, speed, endurance, jumping ability, and the like. . . . As to competitive fairness, the States contend that allowing biological males to play women’s and girls’ sports would put female athletes at a debilitating disadvantage. . . . forcing women and girls to play against biological males can deter some women and girls who would otherwise participate in sports from doing so—out of understandable concern about suffering serious injury or participating in what they view as an unfair competition. . . . the States argue—and we agree—that the interests in safety and competitive fairness are important for purposes of equal protection analysis. And the States’ sex-based classification—limiting women’s and girls’ sports to biological females—is substantially related to those interests. See Skrmetti, 605 U. S., at 510; Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 70 (2001); Michael M. v. Superior Court, Sonoma Cty., 450 U. S. 464, 472–473 (1981) (plurality opinion). Therefore, schools may maintain women’s and girls’ sports for biological females. In other words, schools may determine eligibility for women’s and girls’ sports based on biological sex. . . . In B. P. J.’s case, we reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In Hecox’s case, we reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice Thomas concurs:
The Court correctly holds that neither Title IX nor the Equal Protection Clause prohibits States from offering sex-separated athletics. A man does not have a legal right to compete against women just because he believes that he is a woman. I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to make two points. First, transgender status is not a suspect class requiring heightened equal-protection scrutiny. . . . Second, as the Court recognizes, this case concerns “biological men” and “boys who identify as girls.” Ante, at 10, 27. Men and boys with gender dysphoria are not women or girls, even if they believe that they are. Sex is an immutable “biological” characteristic, see ante, at 10; it is binary; and “man” and “woman,” “boy” and “girl,” are the terms that correspond to adults and children of each sex. . . . To use language to obscure reality—to show “indifference regarding the truth”— is to lie to the public and cease to treat our fellow citizens “as equal[s].”
Justice Gorsuch concurs:
I join the Court’s opinion and write to add two observations about Title IX. First, “Title IX was enacted as an exercise of Congress’ powers under the Spending Clause.” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 181 (2005). That provision of the Constitution does not allow Congress to regulate conduct; instead, it only authorizes Congress to spend money. . . . Second, Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. 644 (2020), supports, not undermines, the Court’s conclusion. . . . it is a mistake to assume that, just because firing someone in part because of his biological sex amounts to unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII, sponsoring a single-sex sports team limited to biological women or girls must also amount to unlawful discrimination in violation of Title IX.
Justice Sotomayor (and Kagan and Jackson) concurs in part and dissents in part:
. . . I agree that B. P. J.’s Title IX claim fails, although on a narrower basis than that on which the majority relies. . . . Because of the medical treatment that B. P. J. has received, she has never experienced a traditional male puberty and so has never experienced elevated levels of circulating testosterone. B. P. J. contends that, as a result, she does not have an inherent athletic advantage due to her sex identified at birth and, accordingly, that her participation in girls’ sports does not threaten competitive fairness or safety, which are the two grounds the State has relied on to justify excluding transgender girls like B. P. J. from girls’ teams. Both sides submitted expert testimony disputing this factual question. . . . West Virginia’s decision to separate sports teams based on an individual’s sex identified at birth is a clear sex classification subject to heightened scrutiny. West Virginia justifies the classification by citing two interests: ensuring (1) competitive athletic opportunities and (2) safety in participation for women and girls in sports. . . . Because the Court today errs by reducing the burden, at least in the sports context, that the Constitution places on state actors when classifying based on sex, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Jackson concurs in part and dissents in part:
I join JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s opinion in full. I write briefly to address B. P. J.’s Title IX claim. . . . In short, the majority is wrong to suggest that the term “sex” in Title IX “cannot plausibly be interpreted to refer to anything other than biological sex.” Ante, at 10. Title IX makes room for individuals to live in the gender they choose; it cares not just about sex assigned at birth but also about individuals’ ability to match (or not) their gender presentation to their gender identity. Because West Virginia’s law forces B. P. J. to live—in this case, to play—as a boy though she is a girl, it might well run afoul of Title IX properly construed.
I agree with the majority. Biological sex is the determining factor regardless of what 'gender' a person claims to be. I think males with low testosterone should be given 'sex-compatible' hormones to treat this issue rather than convincing that male that he is 'female' because of low testosterone and then treating him with female hormones to 'make him a female' (and vice-versa for women). You are the SEX you are born with and if environmental factors have caused you to experience low 'your actual sex' hormones, then the 'appropriate SEX-based' treatment is increasing the hormones you are lacking. Biology is Biology. You cannot change XY chromosomes to XX chromosomes (or XX to XY). It is scientifically impossible at this point in our scientific knowledge and ability. We do not have the ability to make a chromosome by chromosome change from XY to XX (or XX to XY).
Those are some of the exact words used by Google’s censors, aka 'Orwellian content police,' in describing many of our controversial stories. Stories later proven to be truthful and light years ahead of the mainstream media. But because we reported those 'inconvenient truths' they're trying to bankrupt ANP.
